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Abstract 
 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks is one of the 
most challenging areas to deal with in Security. Not 
only do security managers have to deal with flood and 
vulnerability attacks. They also have to consider 
whether they are from legitimate or malicious 
attackers. In our previous work we developed a 
framework called bodyguard, which is to help security 
software developers from the current serialized 
paradigm, to a multi-core paradigm. In this paper, we 
update our research work by moving our bodyguard 
paradigm, into our new Ubiquitous Multi-Core 
Framework. From this shift, we show a marked 
improvement from our previous result of 20% to 110% 
speedup performance with an average cost of 1.5ms. 
We also conducted a second series of experiments, 
which we trained up Neural Network, and tested it 
against actual DDoS attack traffic. From these 
experiments, we were able to achieve an average of 
93.36%, of this attack traffic.  
 
Index Terms — Multicore, Ubiquitous Multicore 
framework, Farmer, Bodyguard Framework 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Today’s internet has evolved into high-speed 
backbones and local-wide area networks, which link 
millions of end-users to many critical services. 
Majority of today’s businesses rely upon these critical 
services to function at full capacity, so that they can 
achieve a greater customer base and profits. A DDoS 
(Distributed Denial of Service) attack puts these 
critical systems under the series threat of collapse and 
loss for these businesses.  
The two major challenges in defending against these 
attacks, is to firstly have a defense system that has 
detection that is sensitive and accurate, while at the 
same time filtering and monitoring the defense system. 
Unfortunately, most defense systems, such as 
traceback [1][2], logging [3][4] and messaging [5][6] 
are just not sensitive enough to be able separate out 
legitimate traffic from attack. Another major problem 
with these defense systems is that, they themselves are 
usually susceptible to the same DDoS attacks, that they 
are trying defending against [7].  
In our previous paper [8] we introduced a defense 
system called Farmer, after the Kevin Costner Movie 
‘Bodyguard’. Farmer was built and developed based on 
our Bodyguard Framework. This Framework is an 
abstract paradigm, which groups class of applications 
based on what functions they provide to the system 
(Security related or Multi-media related). Once these 
applications are grouped they are then placed own 
prospective core process, within a Multi-Core system.  
For example, with Farmer, we separated out different 
parts of security procedures (IP reconstruction, filter 
attack traffic, monitoring farmer) and placed them on 
separate core processors within an Intel Quad-Core 
system. In our former results, we achieved an overall 
speedup performance increase of 20% for our defense 
system. We also gained a number of advantages by 
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applying this framework, which are, firstly the ability 
of our defense system to defend itself against an attack 
in real-time, the ability to record and analysis traffic 
almost simultaneously, protect the defense system by 
having its own redundant defense system, monitor and 
troubleshoot the system if problems arise.  
In this paper we discuss current updates with our 
bodyguard framework, now call Ubiquitous Multicore 
Framework (UM), and continue our experimentation of 
the system.  Section Two briefly covers the related 
work done in Multicore. The details of UM framework 
and how it is applied to the bodyguard framework 
Section Three. Section Four presents the experiments 
and evaluation that were conducted on our system. 
Lastly, Section Five covers the conclusion and future 
work.  
 
2. Related Work  
 
In this section, we discuss very briefly multicore and 
multimedia, and the two areas where our multicore 
framework has been applied.  
 
2.1. Multicore and Multimedia 
 
Multi-core systems can be defined as a system that 
has two or more processing cores integrated into a 
single chip [11][12][13]. Through this design, each 
processing cores has their own private cache (L1) and a 
shared common cache (L2). The shared cache and 
main memory share the bandwidth between all the 
processing cores. Multimedia co-processor interface 
was developed by [14], in which they used a multicore 
system to offload task management jobs from MPU or 
DSP. From their evaluations conducted on a JPEG file, 
Ou et al. achieved an overall performance increase of 
57%, while they kept their overhead to 1.56% of the 
DSP core. In comparison with our UM framework 
[10], our framework is more abstract, by applying 
applications (not separate sections of a file) to separate 
core processors. 
 
2.2. Multi-classifier SPAM filter  
 
To follow up on [8], we then applied our multicore 
framework to a multi-classifier SPAM filter [9]. We 
found that if you ran each classifier process in parallel 
with each other, it greatly improved the performance of 
our multi-classifier architecture, in the areas of false 
positives reduction and increase accuracy. Further,  
Attacker Authorized User Attacker Authorized User
Farmer Farmer
Farmer Farmer
Farmer
Defender/Victim  
Figure 1. System Architecture of Farmer  
 
advantages that our multicore framework provided, is 
as follows: 
• Reduced computation burden of the overall 
mail server. 
• Reduced memory storage, email messages are 
processed independently from other 
classifiers. 
• When one of the classifiers becomes idle it 
will directly go into training mode, thereby 
optimizing resource usage. 
• Is robust as the adaptive selection can still 
provide accurate email classification if one of 
the core fails.  
 
3. Background 
 
3.1 Farmer System Design 
 
The bodyguard framework is distributed on each 
router in the network; in order to provide overall 
protection (Figure 1).  Each Bodyguard is a source end 
(provides security before traffic leaves the router) and 
destination end protector (provides security as the 
traffic enters the network). Another feature in Figure 1 
is that each bodyguard is connected to each other. 
There are three main reasons for this; to allow 
bodyguards to send updated security information to 
each other (new attacks that each has encountered, for 
example), send security information down to the next 
hop for checking application data as it comes into the 
router (This is to provide better performance, by 
breaking up the security and application data), 
monitors the performance of each other (So if a 
successful attack brings down a bodyguard, the next 
hop router is prepared to handle the security).  Farmer 
includes the two parts of the bodyguard framework, the 
side bodyguard (SB) and front bodyguard (FB) (Figure 
2). The side bodyguard is the main component of the 
framework, is to protect the system, while allowing 
application/s to run at full performance potential.  
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Figure 2. Bodyguard Architecture  
 
3.2 Ubiquitous Multicore (UM) Framework 
 
The Ubiquitous Multicore Framework is built from a 
divide-and-conquer approach [15], by dividing our 
applications into specifics classes and places them on 
separate core processors (Figure 3).  Each application 
will run in parallel with each other, and exchange 
information when necessary. The application core 
assigner (ACA), assigns the class applications either on 
behalf of the user, or the user can select from the 
core(s) that are available. Once each application is 
assigned to a core, depending on the application 
program, a number of jobs or threads can then be 
executed on this core processor.  
 
3.3 Applied UM Algorithm to Bodyguard 
Framework 
 
In this paper, we further our research development 
by updating our bodyguard framework by 
incorporating it into our UM algorithm. We also 
include a mathematical partition model (MPM), that 
we adapted and modified from [19][20], so that we can 
evaluate our algorithm.  The MPM, is to used to give a 
clearer picture of how the bodyguard framework is 
partitioned, on a multi-core system. But just separating 
and assigning our bodyguard tells us nothing about the 
speedup performance, if any is achieved, or what the 
overhead costs in terms of this partition are. So we 
have also included formulas (4,5,6) to accomplish this. 
 
Figure 3. Ubiquitous Multicore Framework  
3.4 Mathematical Partition Model 
 
The MPM is adapted and modified from the partition 
analysis of [19][20], in which they analysed the 
speedup performance, computation and communication 
cost and execution times of their partition. To partition 
the application correctly we use three phases, 
communication, computation and communication.  
Phase 1: 
( 1)( )comm stup dt p t t= − +  (1) 
Phase 2: 
*
1comp
mp nt
p
≤
−
 
 
(2) 
Phase 3: 
( )comm stup dt u t vt= +  (3) 
In order to maintain the highest speedup and 
computation/communication ratio we use the Overall 
Execution Time(4), Speedup factor (5), C/C ration (6):  
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4. Performance Evaluation 
 
4.1 Performance Analysis 
To assess the performance of our multicore system, 
we compared the two kernel benchmarks. The 
hardware on the multicore system had Intel Core 2 
Quad Q6600 2.4GHz Quad Core Processor, 2 GB of 
RAM and 2 300GB SATA hard-drives. The kernel  
 
Figure 4. Pseudo Code for MPI “Perfect” parallel 
program.  
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under measurement was 2.6.22.14.72 fc6. To gather 
computational data, we included timers with our 
application, in order to record execution times.  
Communication time is depended upon the number of 
messages, the size of the message and the 
interconnection speed. We have decided to set the 
standard to 1ms and computational data is assumed to 
be .1ms less then execution time.  
 
4.2. Simulation Setup 
 
4.2.1 Benchmark factors  
Once we have the execution times ts, computational 
time tcomp, and communication time tcom, we can 
establish the speedup factor (formula 7) and 
computation/communication ratio (formula 8).  
s s
cp comp com
t t
t t t
=
+
 
 
(7) 
Where ts will stand for execution time on a single core 
processor (tcp), this includes computation time and 
communication time.  
c o m p
c o m
t
t
 
 
(8) 
Apart from speedup and the Computation and 
Communication ratios, we also evaluate the UM 
algorithm, through the use of Time Complexity or 
“big-oh”, also referred to as “order of magnitude” [12] 
( ) ( ( ))f x O g x=  
[ ]0 ( ) ( )f x cg x≤ ≤  for all 0x ≥  
 
(9) 
Where f(x) and g(x) are functions of x. A positive 
constant, c, has to exist for all 0x x≥ otherwise it is 
zero.   
 Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4 
Exe Time 1.5ms 1.4ms 1.3ms 1.4ms 
Comp 
Time 
.3ms .3ms .2ms .3ms 
Comm 
Time 
1ms 1ms 1ms 1ms 
Speed 
Ratio 
115% 108% 108% 108% 
C/C 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Time 
Complex 
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Cost  1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Cost-
Optimal 
3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Table 1. Results of speedup and the costs, which show 
an average increase of 110% at the average cost of 
1.4ms 
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
1 2 3 4 5
Test
Multicore(Serial)
Multicore
Figure 5. Resource Sharing delay time for shared 
memory (latency) 
( / 1) (2 ( / 1)cp com stup mdt t n cp t n cp t+ = + + + +  (10) 
 Where n is the number of threads on each core 
processor. The last benchmark we will use is the cost 
and cost-optimal.  
Cost = (execution time) * (total number of processor 
used) 
Cost Optimal = time complexity * number of processor 
=  (n log n 
MPI Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4 
Exe Time 1.5ms 1.4ms 1.3ms 1.4ms 
Speed 
Ratio 
115% 108% 108% 108% 
C/C 0.5 1.8 0.3 1.8 
Cost  1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 
MultiC Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4 
Exe Time 1.35ms 1.36ms 1.35ms 1.35ms 
Speed 
Ratio 
101% 101% 101% 101% 
C/C 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Cost 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Table 2. Results of speedup and the costs, which show 
an average increase of 105% at the average cost of 
1.4ms for the MPI over our previous Multicore result. 
 
4.3. Experimentation 
 
To give us a baseline of comparison, we wrote a 
program using MPI (19) [See Figure 4], in which the 
program gives us a “perfect” example of parallel 
programming. The results show [table 1] that we 
achieved a speedup result of 110% across of 
bodyguard application. From table 1 we then do a 
comparison of previous results from paper [8], in 
which we selected the best of our results (Figure 5, 
Test 2), and show them along side table 1 (See Table 
2). To make the comparison fair, we used the same 
computation and communication time from the MPI 
program, for our multicore program. What the results 
from Table 2 shows is that our MPI program use’s 
multicore technology with a greater efficiency then our 
multi-core program. 
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MPI 
(MC) 
Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4 
Exe Time 1.10ms 1.15ms 1.11ms 1.11ms 
Comp 
Time 
0ms .04ms .01ms .01ms 
Comm 
Time 
1ms 1ms 1ms 1ms 
Speed 
Ratio 
110% 111% 110% 110% 
C/C 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Cost 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Table 3. Results of speedup and the costs, which show 
an average increase of 110% at the average cost of 
1.4ms for the MPI over our previous Multicore result. 
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Figure 6.  Training Results of our Neural Network 
archived a better than average (94%) result, with an 
average of 6 false positives per test (5 days of tests 
were conducted from the MIT Dataset).  
 
But the reason for this greater efficiency was due to the 
fact that we wrote our multicore program in C++ only. 
Thereby, we used MPI in our multi-core program to 
get the following result in table 3. As we can see, our 
speed up ratio increase from 101% average to 110% 
with the use of MPI. As we see from our previous 
work, we only achieved a 20% increase, but the 
experiments we conducted were quite different (see 
table 4). In S-Core results, we just allowed the program 
to be assigned by the Linux Kernal, in M-Core we 
assigned the programs using affinity methods in C.   
In our second experiment we trained up Farmers side 
bodyguard, which contains our Back Propagation 
Neural Network Filter (placed on core 2) to detect and 
filter DDoS attack traffic. In order to train up our 
Neural Network we used dataset from the week 2, 
1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation set at 
Lincoln   
System T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Total 
S-Core 150 153 150 151 151 150 
M-Core 130 133 129 133 132 130 
       
Speedup 20 20 21 18 19 20 
Table 4. Speedup Comparison between Serial 
Multicore and Multicore 
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Figure 7. Average of 75% was achieved from our 
training results for detecting Legitimate Traffic.   
 Legitimate 
Traffic 
[Best] 
Attack 
Traffic 
[Best] 
Legitimate 
Traffic 
[Worse] 
Attack 
Traffic 
[Worse 
Mon 90.0% 91.25% 75.20% 86.87% 
Tues 92.35% 93.37% 74.37% 85.90% 
Wed 95.62% 94.09% 71.02% 84.90% 
Thur 95.40% 94.01% 72.25% 85.52% 
Fri 95.43% 94.10% 71.17% 83.65% 
Table 5. Test Results from our Neural Network, 
showing the best and worse achieved results.  
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
1 2 3 4 5
Legit  [Best]
Attack [Best ]
Legit  [Worse]
Attack [Worse]
 
Figure 8. Test Results from our Neural Network 
 
Laboratory, MIT [17].  The data sets from MIT come 
in TCP dump format, so we extracted the features we 
needed and insert them into a MySQL database. These 
features included SrcIP, DestIP, SrcPort, DestPort and. 
the length of time.  We added an extra field to the table 
for the decision, 0 for legitimate and 1 for illegitimate. 
Our results shown in Figures 6 and 7, that we were 
able to achieve a +90% of the known attack traffic, 
while allowing 75% of legitimate traffic, with an 
average of 6 false positives per test. This means that 
our security detection is quite sensitive in detecting and 
filtering out DDoS attack traffic. To confirm this result 
we then further our experiment by testing our Neural 
Network against the test data provide by [17]. In Table 
5 and Figure 8 shows, we achieved with our Neural 
Network an average 93.76% for our best result for 
detecting legitimate traffic, while maintaining average 
93.36% in detecting attack traffic. So these results 
shows that our Neural Network is fairly sensitive and 
effective with these types of attacks. This claim is 
further backed up by the “worst” results, that even if 
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our Neural Network is having a “bad” (so to speak), it 
can detect an average of 72.80% legitimate and 
85.37% attack, which is still fairly good against DDoS 
attack.  
Further analysis of why we achieved different results 
with our Neural Network is the way that you have to 
‘tune’ the training of the Neural Network. You do this 
by changing a number of characteristics such as 
Learning Rate, Momentum and Threshold. By 
changing the Learning Rate, for example, you alter 
how the Neural Network learns. This then affects the 
results that are outputted, we selected for the ‘best’ 
results a Learning Rate of 0.2, Momentum 0.6, and 
Threshold of 
0.4. For the worse results we set the Learning Rate at 
0.2, Momentum 0.3, and Threshold 0.7.     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we further extended upon our previous 
work within multicore defense system, by applying the 
UM Framework to our Bodyguard Defense System. 
The goal of such a security system is to use the new 
multicore machines that are coming out, but also, with 
these machines they can be used to solve some of the 
many problems of computer security. Based on the 
results we have showed our defense system is 
improved from 110% speedup, through the use of MPI 
[19]. We, also, showed our test results of Farmer’s side 
bodyguard (Back Propagation Neural Network), which 
would than tell the forward bodyguard to filter the 
attack traffic detected. The results show, based on 10 
tests that we conducted over 4 hours of training the 
system, we got an average of 94% of attack traffic 
detected with an average of 6 false positives per test 
that we conducted.  
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